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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS, 
STATE OF UTAH 
BANK ONE, UTAH, N.A. 
Plaintiff and Appellant, BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
THE CITY OF 
WEST JORDAN, UTAH, 
Defendant and Appellee, 
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To the Honorable Court of 4ppeals: 
The City of West Jordan, the Defendant in Cause No.990909640, in the Third District 
Court, Salt Lake Department, Salt Lake County, Utah, the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod, 
Judge presiding, and Appellee before the Utah Court of Appeals, respectfully submits this 
brief in reply to the brief filed by Appellant appealing the Summary Judgement granted in 
the favor of Appellee. Pursuant to Rule 24(d) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, the 
parties will be referred to as "Appellant" and the "Appellee." 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about September 22, 1999, Appellant commenced an action against Upper 
Valley Utilities (hereinafter "UVU") and Appellee before the Third District Court, Salt Lake 
Department, Judge Stephen L. Henroid, presiding ("District Court"). (R.l-10). Pursuant to 
its Complaint, Appellant sought recovery from these entities for sums which had been 
expended by Appellant to repair a sewer line which was had been damaged by drilling 
activities of UVU. (R. 1-10). The Complaint stated causes of action for negligence, breach 
of statutory duty and unjust enrichment. (R. 1-12). 
On April 20, 2000, Defendant UVU filed for Summary Judgment. (R. 246). The 
basis of UVU's Motion for Summary Judgment was that prior to commencing their drilling 
activities they had contacted Blue Stakes and requested the marking of all underground 
utilities. (R. 247). UVU further contended that the sewer line which had been damaged by 
their drilling activities was not properly marked. (R. 248). By Minute Entry dated May 23, 
2000, (R. 336) the District Court concluded that UVU had complied with the legal 
requirements for requesting the marking of underground utilities prior to commencing their 
drilling activities. This Order has not been appealed by any party. 
Appellee filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on March 24, 2000. (R. 72). The 
Motion for Summary Judgment of Appellee was predicated upon Appellant's failure to serve 
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Appellee a Notice of Claim within one year of the accrual of Appellant's cause of action. 
(R. 75-115). This Motion was granted by the District Court by Minute entry dated May 23, 
2000 (R. 337), which Minute Entry was subsequently reduced to an Order on June 28,2000. 
(R. 383-384). The District Court ruled that Appellant's Notice of Claim filed March 22, 
2000 was untimely as Appellant's claim accrued on the date Appellant was injured, March 
15, 1999. (Id.) Because Appellant filed its notice of claim more than one year after the 
claim accrued, the District Court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to hear Appellant's 
Complaint. (Id.) 
Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Court on July 7,2000 
(R. 401). The Appellant then filed a timely notice of appeal and brief. (R. 405). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On February 25, 1999, UVU prepared for drilling activities by notifying "Blue 
Stakes" of its intent to excavate in the vicinity of 9000 South to 9700 South Redwood Road. 
(R. 231-232). Drilling commenced sometime after this date and before March 15, 1999, 
when Appellant first learned of an obstruction in its sewer line. (R. 1-10). As a result of the 
drilling performed by UVU, Appellant suffered damage to the sewer line servicing the 
Appellant's property. (R. 120,146-7). As noted, Appellant was made aware of this problem 
by the subsequent difficulty that occurred with the operation of the pluming on his property 
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on March 15, 1999. (R. 1-10). Appellant notified Appellee of the sewer line problem on 
March 15, 1999, and the line was then inspected by Appellee. (R. 120, 170). At a March 
22, 1999 meeting between Appellant, Appellee, and UVU, a dispute arose reg rding who 
was liable to pay for the sewer line to be repaired. (R. 121, 147, 170). On April 1, 1999, 
Appellant hired a private contractor to repair the sewer line. (R. 122). 
Appellant commenced action against Appellee by filing a Complaint on Sep ember 
27, 1999. (R. 1-10). Appellant's Complaint alleged that the cause of action arose on or 
about March 15, 1999. (R. 1-10). On or about Mid October of 1999, legal counsel for 
Appellant contacted a West Jordan City Attorney and asked the counsel for Appellee how 
to properly serve process on Appellee. (R. 190-191). Appellant's counsel failed to identi V 
himself as counsel for the Appellant or clarify why he was asking Appellee to provide such 
information. (Id.). Appellee nonetheless informed the caller to whom such service was to 
be made. (Id.) The parties discuss nothing beyond how to serve process upon Appellee. 
(Id.). Appellee accepted service of Appellant's Complaint on October 26,1999 and filed an 
Answer on November 12, 1999. (R. 41, 47). Appellant's complaint did not allege that 
Appellant had complied with the procedural requirements of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act, nor did Appellant's Complaint acknowledge the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act in any other manner. (R. 1-10). Appellee's Answer included the affirmative 
defense that one or more of Appellant's claims may be barred by the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 et seq.. (R. 53). 
After Appellant's counsel granted one extension of time in which to return 
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Appellant's Interr* gatories, Appellee filed a Certificate of Service of Answers to 
Appellant's Inter ogatories before the District Court on or about March 24, 2000 with a 
Mailing Certific te dated March 20,2000. (R. 72,158,192,193). After reading Appellee's 
Answers to Pk .ntiff s First Set of Interrogatories, Appellant realized, for the first time, that 
Utah Code A m. § 63-30-13 required Appellant to serve Appellee with a Notice of Claim 
within one /ear after a claim arises, and that Appellant had not filed a Notice of Claim 
before cor lmencing this action. (R. 158). 
C l March 22, 2000, Appellant served Appellee with a notice of claim. (AB 8). 
Appell: nt's Notice of Claim departs from the factual allegations of Plaintiff s Complaint in 
that t\e Notice of Claim alleges the underlying cause of action did not arise as until a 
mee ing occurred on March 22, 1999, between Appellant and Appellee's Public Works 
De jartment employees, when the damage to the sewer line was discussed. (R. 78,123). On 
K arch 24, 1999, Appellee filed a Motion for Summary Judgment based upon Appellant's 
failure to comply with the statutory requirements outlined in the Governmental Immunity 
Act. (R.72, 158). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Appellant served Appellee with a Notice of Claim on March 22,2000, requesting that 
Appellee be reimbursed the costs of a repair performed on April 1, 1999, for a specific 
injury to a sewer line that occurred on March 15, 1999. Appellant argues that they did not 
fail to met the statutorily defined requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, 
specifically their duty to file a Notice of Claim within one year of the date on which the 
cause of action accrued. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13. Appellant challenges the District 
Court's ruling that as a mater of law, Appellant's Notice of Claim filed on March 22, 2000 
was untimely. Appellee believes the District Court was correct in their finding that the cause 
of action arose on March 15,1999, and as a result the subsequent filing of a Notice of Claim 
on March 22, 2000 was untimely. 
Alternatively, Appellant argues that even if Appellant's damages occurred on March 
15, 1999, and as a result the March 22, 2000 filing did not met the statutorily defined 
requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Appellee should be estopped from 
relying on the Utah Governmental Immunity Act to bar Appellant's claims. The Appellant 
presents allegations of having been induced and mislead into failing to file a timely Notice 
of Claim. The District Court correctly found that the Appellee did not induce or mislead 
Appellant, and as a result, the District Court was correct in their finding that the Appellee 
was not estopped from raising Appellant's failure to file a Notice of Claim as an affirmative 
defense. 
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ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN CONCLUDING AS A 
MATTER OF LAW THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF CLAIM 
FILED MARCH 22, 2000 WAS UNTIMELY. 
This Court should uphold the District Court's ruling that Appellant's Notice of Claim, 
filed after a year had lapsed from the date Appellant's claim accrued. Appellee agrees with 
Appellant's statement of the law governing when a limitation period begins to run, which 
is, "upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action." Dav 
v. State bv and Through Utah Dept. of Public Safety. 882 P.2d 1150.1153 (Utah 1994). In 
applying this rule of law to Appellant's case, the District Court ruled that damage to 
Appellant's property was the last event necessary to trigger Appellant's cause of action, and 
the damage to Plaintiffs property occurred on March 15, 1999. (R. 381). Appellant cites 
this ruling as error. Appellant argues that the District Court should have ruled that 
Appellant's claims were not perfected until the sum total of Appellant's damages accrued, 
regardless of whether the actual injury occurred on March 15,1999. In an attempt to bolster 
his argument, Appellant relies on Seale v. Gowans, which stands for the proposition that a 
cause of action may not be brought for an "inchoate wrong." Seale v. Gowans, 923 P. 2d 
1361, 1364 (Utah 1996). Appellee submits that the injury which occurred on March 15, 
1999, the date upon which UVU injured the property by severing a sewer line, could not 
possibly be characterized as an "inchoate wrong." 
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UVU inflicted a tangible, measurable injury to Appellant's property on March 15, 
1999, which in itself gave rise to a claim for injury. Appellee asserts that Appellant's 
monetary expense to repair the March 15,1999 damage merely evinces the degree of injury. 
However, Appellant's payment to repair the damaged sewer lateral line cannot be 
misconstrued to mean Appellant was not injured until it paid to repair the same. As noted 
in Allegation No. 11 of Appellant's own Complaint, "rupture and damage [to the sewer 
lateral line] caused loss of sewer service to [Appellee]." (R. 3). Accordingly, Appellant 
was injured at the moment it lost sewer service, which occurred when UVU ruptured the 
sewer lateral line on or about March 15, 1999. Appellant's loss of sewer service was a 
tangible injury, cited by Appellant, which triggered commencement of Appellant's time to 
file a Notice of Claim of Injury. 
Appellant also asks this Court to assume arguendo that Appellant repaired a sewer 
line belonging to Appellee. (AB. 12). In doing so, Appellee has raised an allegation for the 
first time on appeal which was never raised before the District Court. (AB. 12). Appellee 
disputes that it owns the damaged sewer, which is a lateral line servicing Appellant's 
property. However, since Appellant never alleged this before the District Court, this Court 
should not rely upon Appellant's allegation in calculating Appellant's time for filing a 
Notice of Claim. This Court should instead rely upon General Allegation No. 11., which 
was used as Appellant's basis for negligence in Allegation No. 29. (R. 3, 5). 
Appellee further believes that if it had elected to pay to repair the sewer line, 
Appellant would not have been prevented from bringing a subsequent cause of action 
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against Appellee for any remaining consequential damages associated with the disruption 
of Appellant's sewer service. As a result of making such an argument, Appellant would 
have to rely upon the March 15, 1999 injury to the sewer line as the last event necessary to 
complete its cause of action. This fact highlights the inconsistency in Appellant's position 
when reading its Notice of Claim together with its Complaint. 
Appellee urges this Court to agree with the District Court's conclusion that, as a 
matter of law, Appellant's notice of claim filed on March 22, 2000 was untimely under the 
statutory guidelines set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13. Appellee submits that Jepson 
v. State, 846 P.2d 485 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993) provides the only basis for characterizing the 
relationship between injury, damages, and commencement of a limitations period. In 
Jepson. the plaintiff was injured by an automobile, driven by an employee for the Utah 
Department of Corrections. Id. at 486. Similar to the Appellant in this case, the defendant 
in Jepson filed a Notice of Claim after the time to do so had lapsed under the statutory 
guidelines set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13. Id. Once the plaintiff commenced an 
action for injuries sustained in the accident, the defendant filed a summary judgment motion, 
based upon plaintiffs failure to timely file a Notice of Claim. Id. In his reply, the plaintiff 
claimed that his injuries didn't meet the minimum statutory requisite showing of $3,000.00 
in damages until over a year after the date of the accident. Id. Under Utah Code Ann. § 
31A-22-309, the plaintiff was precluded from commencing an action until plaintiffs 
damages equaled $3,000.00. In affirming the District Court's entry of summary judgment 
for the defendant, the Utah Court of Appeals held that full knowledge of a claimant's 
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damages need not be established until the time of trial, and therefore do not toll the 
limitation period for filing a Notice of Claim, or a Complaint: 
Complaints are frequently filed before the full facts regarding injury and 
liability are known [Ajlthough uncertain that the threshold requirements 
will be met, a claimant may nonetheless file a compliant in tort realizing, 
however, that the claim may prove not to be not actionable in the event the 
cost of treatment fails to equal the threshold amount, at least by time of trial. 
Id. at 487. 
Quoting Cappadona v. Eckelmann, 388 A.2d 239, 242 (1978). Appellee submits that 
Appellant is in the same position as the plaintiff in Jepson. Looking forward from the date 
of Appellant's injury, or March 15,1999, at which time Appellant was aware of such injury, 
all of the elements necessary to bring a cause of action were known to Appellant. The only 
remaining issue is the extent to which Plaintiff could seek damages for Appellant's injury. 
Appellant's damages could have been resolved at any time up to the date of trial. 
In light of Jepson, Appellant believes that Utah Code Ann § 54-8a-7 is analogous 
to Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309, in that § 54-8a-7 does not by itself govern when a claim 
arises. Jepson, at 487. Appellee's duty to repair the sewer, if any, arises after there are 
sufficient facts for Appellant to perfect its cause of action. Therefore, Appellee interprets 
§ 54-8a-7 to describe the Appellee's requirement to mitigate damage to Appellee's own 
sewer line after the Appellee has breached a statutory duty imposed by Utah Code Ann. § 
54-8a-5. The facts of this case clearly show that any breach of statutory duty under § 54-8a-
5 would have occurred from the time Appellee received notice to mark its sewers, until the 
injury occurred on March 15, 1999. 
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Appellant's original Complaint asserts that the cause of action arose on March 15, 
1999. (R. 2). Appellant now urges this court to consider facts alleged outside Appellant's 
Complaint, in a Notice of Claim, that was filed on March 22, 2000. In Appellant's Brief, 
Appellant implies that this Court can include facts mentioned in its Notice of Claim form, 
because, "If the Notice is delivered after the filing of the Complaint a Plaintiff may amend 
the Complaint to include allegations of compliance with the Governmental Immunity Act 
and proceed after the 90 day waiting period " (AB. 11, footnote / ) . While this general 
rule is correct under Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Office, 621 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1980), 
Appellant has misdirected its application to this case. Appellant never sought leave of the 
District Court to amend its Complaint to conform with the facts of its Notice of Claim. 
Because Appellant never amended its Complaint, the significance of the Notice of Claim 
extends only to determine when Appellant served the Notice of Claim on Appellee. This 
Court should not accept facts alleged in the Notice of Claim where they are inconsistent with 
Appellant's Complaint. 
On March 15, 1999, the elements necessary to bring a complaint regarding the 
offense at hand had occurred and is reflected by this date in Appellant's own original 
Complaint. (R. 1-12). Appellee respectfully submits that this Court should reject 
Appellant's first point of error, and affirm the District Court's finding that Appellant's case 
must be dismissed as a result Appellant's failure to comply with the statutory guidelines set 
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 et seq.. 
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II. THE CITY OF WEST JORDAN SHOULD NOT BE ESTOPPED 
FROM RAISING A FAILURE TO FILE A NOTICE OF CLAIM 
ARGUMENT UNDER THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY ACT. 
This Court should affirm the District Court's ruling that Appellee is not estopped 
form raising Appellant's failure to comply with Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 as an 
affirmative defense because Appellee properly raised this affirmative defense in Appellee's 
Answer, and Appellee did nothing to mislead Appellant's case. Appellee asserts that 
Appellant's case was procedurally flawed from the moment Appellant filed its Complaint 
before the District Court. In fact, Appellee had no information to suggest Appellant's claim 
existed until Appellant had filed its Complaint before the District Court. Appellee believes 
that, as a matter of law, Appellee's affirmative defense No. 5 was sufficient to notify 
Appellant of its failure to comply with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (R. 53). 
Shunk v. State, 924 P.2d 879 (Utah 1996). In Shunk, the state attorney general's office 
answered to the plaintiffs complaint and affirmatively pleaded, "plaintiff has failed to 
comply with the Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. 63-30-1 et seq." Id. at 881. 
Relying upon this affirmative defense, the defendant brought a motion for summary 
judgment, citing the plaintiffs failure to comply with Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13. Id. The 
Court found defendant's answer sufficient to assert an affirmative defense: 
Where the statutes are clear, as in this case, as to the requirement for serving 
a notice of claim on a political subdivision, we cannot require and the statutes 
do not require that the state or its subdivisions promptly notify claimants of 
deficiencies of the notice of claim so as to allow them an opportunity to timely 
rectify their error or deficiency. Id. at 882. 
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On this basis, the Court concluded that the defendant in Shunk was "not obligated to 
deny compliance with section 63-30-13 when plaintiff had not alleged such compliance." 
Id. The language of Appellee's Answer is virtually identical to the defendant's answer in 
Shunk. The Appellee's affirmative defense reads as follows, 
As a separate and affirmative defense, Defendant West Jordan City 
affirmatively alleges that one or more of Plaintiff s claims may be barred by 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-
1 et seq. (R. 53). 
Relying upon Shunk, the District Court ruled the language in the Appellee's answer to 
Appellant's complaint as sufficient ground upon which to move for summary judgment in 
this case, because Appellant had not alleged compliance with the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. 
Appellant is asking this Court to ignore Shunk on the basis that Appellee should be 
estopped from raising Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 as an affirmative defense, under the 
precedents set in Rice v. Granite School District. 456 P.2d 159 (Utah 1969), and Johnson 
v. City of Bountiful 996 F.Supp (D. Utah 1998). Although Appellee acknowledges that the 
decision in Rice was given from a Court of binding precedent, Appellee notes that Johnson 
states a more concise basis for finding estoppel given the facts of this case. To establish a 
claim of estoppel, Appellant must demonstrate: 
(1) a statement or act by any one party inconsistent with a claim later asserted; 
(2) a reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken on the basis of the 
first party's statement or action; (3) injury to the second party that would 
result from allowing the first party to contradict such statement or action. 
Johnson, 996 F.Supp at 1103. The defendant in Johnson was estopped from asserting the 
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Governmental Immunity Act as an affirmative defense because, before plaintiffs time for 
filing a proper notice of claim had lapsed, legal counsel for the defendant accepted liability 
for the accident at issue, had agreed to pay for the plaintiffs damages, and had in fact paid 
some of the plaintiffs expenses. Id. These statements and acts were diametrically 
inconsistent with the defendant's subsequent assertion that the plaintiffs failure to file a 
notice of claim barred recovery. Id. The plaintiff had relied on the defendant's assurances 
and partial payment, and so doing refrained from filing a notice of claim, and "plaintiff 
would obviously be injured and the victim of injustice if [the defendant] were now allowed 
to contradict such statements [by raising said affirmative defense]. Id. The plaintiff in Rice 
had also been assured she would be indemnified for her injuries. Rice, 456 P.2d at 161. The 
effect of such assurances was to lull her into a "false sense of security," which estopped the 
defendant from asserting the plaintiffs claim was time-barred. Id. at 163. 
Appellee asserts its actions cited by Appellant do not approach the facts of either Rice 
or Johnson. In support of its estoppel claim, Appellant directs the Court's attention to an 
affidavit filed in the District Court from Mr. Bradley G. Nycamp, Appellant's legal counsel, 
regarding a telephone conversation between himself and the "West Jordan City Attorney." 
(R. 190-191). Appellee notes that the facts which this affidavit does not assert, demonstrates 
Appellant's basis for claiming estoppel is inadequate. Mr. Nycamp does not assert that (1) 
he identified himself or his client; (2) that he had any meaningful discussion with the West 
Jordan City Attorney about the facts of this case; or (3) that the West Jordan City Attorney 
made any representations about the City's legal position on the merits of this case. (R. 190-
17 
191). The most favorable interpretation of Mr. Nycamp's affidavit in support of Appellant 
is that an anonymous telephone call was made to the West Jordan City Attorney's Office, 
and a single question was asked regarding the procedure for serving a complaint upon 
Appellee. We can only assume from the vagueness of Mr. Nycamp's affidavit that the West 
Jordan City Attorney answered this question correctly. 
To follow the argument of the Appellant, Appellee's counsel would be required to 
conclude that a general discussion regarding the service of a complaint upon the City 
requires the counsel for the City to voluntarily provide each anonymous telephone caller 
with a legal tutorial on how to follow the statutory requirements of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act, because failure to do so would be inconsistent with raising Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-13 as an affirmative defense. Appellee believes that, where Mr. Xycamp did not 
raise the Utah Governmental Immunity Act during this conversation, Appellee cannot have 
taken an inconsistent position in its Answer, simply because the West Jordan City Attorney 
did not volunteer information about the same during an anonymous telephone conversation. 
The Supreme Court has reviewed other cases with more substantial facts in favor of 
estoppel and held estoppel was not warranted. Cornwall v. Larsen, et aU 571 P.2d 925, 
(Utah 1977). In Cornwall a claimant's attorney failed to file a complaint against Salt Lake 
County within one year after the claim was denied, as required by law in effect at that time. 
Id. at 926. The claimant attempted to claim that Salt Lake County's insurance carrier 
requested information from the claimant, thereby lulling the claimant into believing he 
needn't comply with statutory requirements to maintain suit. Id. This argument was 
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summarily rejected because "the actions of the adjuster under those circumstances were not 
such as would warrant a conclusion tha4, the clear mandate of the statute need not be 
followed." Id. at 927. The facts under Cc Tiwall more strongly support estoppel than the 
facts presented in this case because the claimant in Cornwall could at least establish that a 
meaningful dialogue occurred between the parties. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court found 
insufficient ground to award estoppel. 
Appellant also asserts that Appellee's req lest for an extension to answer discovery 
supports Appellant's estoppel theory because App pliant did not discover it neglected to file 
a Notice of Claim until it received Appellant's answ ?r to interrogatories. Because it granted 
an extension, Appellant received discovery after the time for filing a Notice of Claim had 
lapsed. As already noted, Appellee believes that Appellant cannot claim surprise where 
Appellee's Answer to Appellant's Complaint identified Appellant's failure to comply with 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Furthermore, du.ing oral argument for Appellee's 
Motion for Summary Judgment before the District Court, Appellee explained that he did not 
request an extension because of an intent to deceive Appellant, which squarely refuted the 
proposition that the request lulled Appellant into refraining . -om filing a Notice of Claim. 
In response to hearing Appellee's argument, Appellant accep sd our explanation, stating, 
more or less, that they "take [Appellee's legal counsel] at his wo.d," and effectively waived 
Appellant's estoppel claim before the District Court, concentrating instead on whether the 
last event to trigger Appellant's cause of action occurred after Ma/ch 15, 1999. Appellant 
has attempted to shield this Court from these facts by certifying thai a transcript of the oral 
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argument is not required for this case. (R. 413). As z general rule, where a litigant raises 
an issue by motion before a District Court, but subsequently waives the same during oral 
argument or trial, this Court will not review the issue on appeal. See generally Hart v. Salt 
Lake County Commission, 945 P.2d 125 (Utah App. 1997). Under the facts of this case, 
Appellee is at least entitled to a presumption thru the District Court correctly disposed of 
issues surrounding Appellant's estoppel claim oecause this Court contains an inadequate 
record of the same. Sawyers v. Sawyers. 558 P.2d 607, 608-609 (Utah 1976). Once this 
Court settles on which facts it may review tc judge Appellant's estoppel claim, this Court 
must remain cognizant of whether estopp J1 here would be adverse upon public policy. 
Appellee "may not be estopped unless injustice would result and there would be no 
substantial adverse effect on public policy." Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. Of State 
Lands. 802 P. 2d 720,728 (Utah 1990). Appellee believes that granting estoppel in this case 
here would adversely impact public policy for several reasons. First, Appellee believes that 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, as written, was intended to prolect governmental 
entities from excessive, frivolous li1 igation at the taxpayers' expense. Where a governmental 
entity is surprised, by service of a lawsuit, to leam that a dispute exists, this Court should not 
estop the entity from raising Ut .h Code Ann. § 63-30-13 as a defense, because estoppel in 
this instance would effectively expose the entity to excessive litigation. 
Second, Appellant cannot blame Appellee for its own neglect in this case. Appellee 
notes that Appellant is a sophisticated business entity within the state of Utah, represented 
by sophisticated legal counsel which Appellant retained within a year from the date this 
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cause of action occurred. Because this case consists of a sophisticated litigant which made 
an elementary legal error on it own accord, estoppel would result in placing a duty on the 
West Jordan City Attorney to serve and protect the legal rights of parties who bring adverse 
claims against Appellee. The West Jordan City Attorney cannot simultaneously represent 
the interest of Appellant and his own client. Appellee believes this case would establish 
such a precedent, where there are no facts to show Appellee's assertion of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-13 is inconsistent with a prior legal position. 
Appellant seeks to support its estoppel claim by asking this Court to accept the law 
of New Jersey as binding precedent, under Hill v. Middletown Bid of Ed., 443 A.2d 225 
(N.J. Super.A.D. 1982). Appellant submits that this Court should not rely upon Hill. 
Appellant ignores the fact that Hill arises from a general rule in New Jersey where, "even 
if there is no substantial compliance with the notice provisions of the Tort Claims Act, a 
public entity will be estopped from asserting this defense "where the interests of justice, 
morality, and common fairness dictate that course."" Id. at 227, Quoting Anske v. Palisades 
Park, 139 N.J. Super. 342,348 (App. Div. 1976). Appellee has already stated, following the 
Plateau Mining Co. case, that this Court cannot estop Appellee until it finds injustice and 
an adverse effect on public policy would result. Id Furthermore, the law of New Jersey 
enables the courts to exercise discretion in extending a 90 day filing requirement to a period 
of one year. Hill at 227. In sharp contrast to New Jersey law, a claimant's failure to strictly 
comply with the notice of claim provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
"deprive[s] the District Court of jurisdiction" over the cause of action. Litster v. Utah 
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Vallev Community College. 881 P.2d 933, 938 (Utah App. 1992). This is true regardless 
of whether the governmental entity has actual notice of the claim. Id. Appellee believes that 
since Utah law hinges subject matter jurisdiction upon whether a notice of claim is timely 
filed, the grounds for estoppel are substantially narrower than that of New Jersey. 
Appellant's original Complaint stated that the cause of action arose on March 15, 
1999. The actions of the Appellee under the facts of this case do not draw a reasonable 
mind to the conclusion that the clear mandate of the statute need not be followed. Appellant 
admitted to failing to give proper notice to Appellee in his own Opposition to Defendant 
West Jordan City's Motion for Summary Judgment (Rl 16), and has failed to provide proof 
as to the Appellees inducement or misleading statements or actions that refrained Appellant 
from filing a timely Notice of Claim. As a result of the facts and argument as given above, 
Appellee respectfully submits that Appellant's second point of error should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER 
For the reasons stated above, no reversible error has been committed and the Appellee 
respectfully prays that the Honorable Court of Appeals should in all things affirm the 
judgment of the District Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Ryan Carter 
Assistant City Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing brief has 
been delivered to Arnold Richer or Mark E. Medcalf, attorney's for the Appellant, by 
placing a copy in the United States Mail, addressed to Richer, Swan & Overholt, P.C., 6925 
South Union Park Center, Suite 450, Midvale, Utah 84047 on this j£_ day oikiA&tiST , 
2001. 
Ryan Carter 
Assistant City Attorney 
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